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Introduction 
 
One of the central debates in the social science literature on globalisation relates to 
the impact it is having on state power. As Bisley puts it: ‘Unsurprisingly, the 
proposition that globalization is hollowing out the state has become one of the 
central arguments in the globalization debate’ (Bisley, 2007: 56). Yet, his survey of 
the literature concludes that ‘there is little empirical evidence to support the 
position’ and that policy makers throughout the world do not feel their work is 
pointless. ‘The state is very much alive’, he concludes (ibid.: 66). In the light of this, 
the debate has to an extent moved on to consider the nature of the changes to state 
power entailed by the processes we label globalisation. In what ways is 
globalisation impacting on state power and with what consequences for economic 
and social well-being? Sørensen has summarised the nature of the empirical issue to 
be examined when he concluded that modernising states ‘must be understand as 
what they really are: as systems in a complex and contradictory process of 
transformation, profoundly changing states from what they were but not subjecting 
them to a simple process of becoming either “weaker” or “stronger”’ (Sørensen, 
2004: 160). 
 
Abstract 
International attention has been focused on the mechanisms 
through which Ireland created the conditions for its economic 
boom in the late 1990s, the Celtic Tiger. Foremost among these 
was the role of the state on which extensive debates developed. 
This paper surveys the role played by the Irish state, identifying 
the principal policy mechanisms  used. The following section 
surveys debates on how the Irish state has itself changed over the 
period of the Celtic Tiger, between proponents of Ireland as a 
developmental state and those who argue that Ireland is a 
competition state. The essential differences between both 
characterisations are identified. This opens an examination in the 
following section of how the differences can be explained which 
seeks to find common ground to understand the nature of the 
contemporary Irish state. The final section draws lessons for the 
international debates on the nature of the state in this globalised 
world. 
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The role the state has played in Ireland’s economic transformation makes it an 
interestesting case to examine, despite claims by some that it is atypical. The Celtic 
Tiger period of Ireland’s development has seen the country’s economy and society 
transformed, as the Economist magazine put it, ‘from basket case to “emerald tiger” 
in ten years’ constituting ‘one of the most remarkable economic transformations of 
recent years’ (May 17th, 1997). Furthermore, the role of the state in this 
transformation has been widely acknowledged; as Nolan et al. put it: ‘The state has 
been deeply implicated in the entire process, managing both economic development 
and the welfare state’ (Nolan et al., 2000: 2). Through active industrial policies, 
stable macroeconomic management and attention to social inclusion by means of a 
more activist social policy, the Irish state has helped foster the conditions for the 
private sector to thrive, upgrading the productivity, technological capacity and 
skills base of the Irish economy, and an active partnership in policy making and 
implementation between the state, the private sector and organisations of the poor 
and marginalised. Furthermore, this transformation has, in the eyes of some 
analysts, resulted from the way Ireland opened up to globalisation. As Smith put it: 
‘The Irish Republic is perhaps the test case for globalisation’ (Smith, 2005: 2; 
emphasis in original). This found some evidential support in the fact that Ireland 
emerged as the most globalised country in the world three years in a row on the 
widely referenced globalisation index produced by Foreign Policy magazine – 6th 
place in 2001, 1st place in 2002, 2003 and 2004, 2nd place in 2005, 4th place in 2006 and 
5th place in 2007 (see A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 
2002, 2001). Examining the role played by the Irish state in this transformation and, 
more importantly, how this has reconfigured the nature of the Irish state, thus has 
lessons to offer for the wider international debates. This is the subject of this paper. 
 
The chapter begins by surveying the role played by the Irish state, identifying the 
principal policy mechanisms used. The following section surveys debates on how 
the Irish state has itself changed over the period of the Celtic Tiger, between 
proponents of Ireland as a developmental state and those who argue that Ireland is 
a competition state. The essential differences between both characterisations are 
identified. This opens an examination in the following section of how the 
differences can be explained which seeks to find common ground to understand the 
nature of the Irish state today. The final section draws lessons for the international 
debates on the nature of the state in this globalised world.   
 
Role of the Irish state 
 
The is a widespread consensus in the literature on Ireland’s ‘economic miracle’ that 
four sets of policy instruments were central to the success achieved – active 
industrial policies (and the role played by EU structural funds in facilitating such 
policies), policies on education and training, the innovative concertative 
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arrangements known in Ireland as ‘social partnership’ and a new activism in the 
state’s social policy. Each is surveyed in turn. 
 
i) Active industrial policy:  
 
The large economic literature that seeks to explain Ireland’s exceptional 
performance from 1994 to 2007 (exceptional both in relation to previous Irish 
performance and in relation to experience among most industrialised countries over 
this period) identifies a range of factors as laying the foundations for the boom, 
among them industrial, educational and infrastructural policies. Undoubtedly, as 
Fitz Gerald has written: ‘The pro-active industrial strategy pursued by Irish policy 
makers was central to the long-term development of a strong industrial base’ (Fitz 
Gerald, 2000: 38). The state Industrial Development Authority (IDA) became very 
successful at identifying emerging sectors in the global economy and attracting 
many of the major companies in those sectors to Ireland. While this strategy had 
initially begun in the 1960s by attracting clothing and textile firms like Wrangler, 
Bluebell, Farah Jeans and Burlington Industries, in the 1970s an electronics sector 
was established by attracting firms like General Electric, Ecco and Core Memories. 
Already in 1971 the computer manufacturer Digital had been attracted to set up a 
plant in Galway and this marked the beginning of a strategy to develop a cluster of 
computer manufacturers in Ireland.  
 
In 1980 Apple was attracted to establish its European manufacturing base in Cork 
and in 1989 Intel was successfully lobbied to establish a major centre in Kildare, just 
outside Dublin. Bradley identifies the IDA’s success as stemming from its ability to 
target firms ‘at a relatively early stage in their (technological) life-cycle, immediately 
after the new product development stage’ in the sectors of computers, related 
software, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. He gives the example of the IDA first 
lobbying computer manufacturers and their subsequent targeting of the makers of 
individual computer components, such as keyboards, hard disks, cables, mice, 
printers and software (Bradley, 2002: 41). Another key element of the IDA’s 
armoury in attracting firms has been Ireland’s low-tax regime on company profits 
(a 10 per cent tax rate on manufacturing profits guaranteed for 20 years was 
introduced in the early 1970s and in 2003 this became a blanket 12.5 per cent tax on 
all trading companies). This has again and again been promoted by policy makers 
and senior company managers as the single most important reason for Ireland’s 
success in winning high levels of FDI (see, for example, Mac Sharry and White, 
2000). 
 
The remarkable success of this strategy, boosted by the expansion of the EU 
economy throughout the 1990s and by the advantages offered by Ireland as a 
relatively low-cost manufacturing platform with access to the EU market, is 
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illustrated by the growth in inward FDI flows from 2.2 per cent of Ireland’s GDP in 
1990 to 49.2 per cent in 2000 (World Bank, 2002: Table 6.1). Bradley summarises the 
IDA’s success in the 1990s: 
 The high point of the IDA strategy came during the late 1990s, when 
Ireland became the front-runner for most of the sophisticated foreign 
investment in electronics, computers and software. A virtuous circle had 
been created, with electronic components and computer equipment at its 
core, a spillover into PC-related software development and customisation, 
and a further spillover into telecommunications-based marketing, customer 
and technical support services both for existing producers located in Ireland, 
as well as for the creation of a sophisticated international financial services 
sector (Bradley, 2002: 52).  
 
In many ways, Ireland was very lucky. Not only did it get its national finances in 
order just in time to benefit from the US boom and from the completion of the 
Single Market in the then European Community, but it also benefited from the new 
funding lines established by the EC in the late 1980s to improve the infrastructure 
and standard of living in its poor countries and regions, the structural and cohesion 
funds (Delors I 1989-93 and Delors II 1994-99). Ireland was successful in winning 
high levels of these funds on a per capita basis and they were spent in four main 
areas – upgrading infrastructure (roads, ports, communications), improving human 
resources (education and training), aids to the private sector (grants and subsidies 
to aid new industries) and income support (mostly to farmers and rural dwellers). 
O’Donnell estimates that Ireland’s net receipts from the EU averaged over 5 per 
cent of GNP throughout the 1990s with a peak of 7.6 per cent in 1991 (O’Donnell, 
2000: 185). 
 
The late 1980s and 1990s also witnessed significant policy innovation by the Irish 
state. A central policy shift in industrial policy followed the Telesis Report of 1982. 
This was very critical of the state’s exclusive dependence on foreign multinationals 
and urged greater support for indigenous industry. As Ó Riain puts it, it ‘did cause 
a stir within the policy community’ and ‘the general tenor of policy did shift 
through the 1980s to consider some of the recommendations of the Telesis Report’ 
including a reorganisation of the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) into two 
divisions in 1988, one for foreign-owned industry and one for Irish-owned (Ó Riain, 
2004: 181). This new set of industrial development agencies focused on indigenous 
industries and, crucially, on business and technological upgrading through 
networking in a proactive way local business entrepreneurs with university 
research centres and state officials. Ó Riain has charted the upgrading of 
investment, R&D, skills, and productivity that took place in key sectors of the Irish 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s through this innovative alliance of state officials, 
business entrepreneurs and university research institutes. Many of these 
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entrepreneurs were young people who had gained experience working in 
multinational enterprises either in Ireland or abroad. Most noteworthy was the 
emergence of an Irish software industry which Ó Riain calls ‘the leading edge of 
indigenous industrial upgrading in the Celtic Tiger’ (Ó Riain, 2004: 56). However, 
despite the turnaround in the fortunes of indigenous industry, a marked dualism 
between foreign and indigenous firms continued to mark Ireland’s industrial 
structure, even at the height of the Celtic Tiger boom. Gallagher et al. conclude 
about this period: ‘Foreign-owned industry treats Ireland as an export platform, 
generating 74 per cent of total Irish exports in 1998. On the other hand, while 85 per 
cent of local plants are Irish owned and 53 per cent of manufacturing employment 
is generated in these plants, they produce just 28 per cent of gross output’ 
(Gallagher et al., 2002: 64).  
 
ii) Education and training: 
 
The foundations for educational expansion and reform, and for active training 
policies, were laid under a series of young and energetic Ministers for Education in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s; these were to be identified as playing a significant 
role in Ireland’s later economic success. The introduction of free secondary 
education in 1967 saw a major increase in the numbers of students completing 
secondary education. Between 1965 and the late 1990s, the proportion of 15-year-
olds participating in full-time education increased from 50 per cent to 100 per cent 
while for 17-year-olds the increase was from 25 per cent to 81 per cent. As Smyth et 
al. put it: ‘The 1970s and 1980s had seen the transformation of second-level 
education from one serving an elite group of students to a system of mass 
education’ (Smyth et al., 2007: 139). The curriculum was also reformed in the light 
of a major OECD report on Irish education in 1966 entitled Investment in Education 
which identified major shortcomings in the contribution of education to providing 
the skills necessary for economic development. A major expansion of technological 
and vocational education was also begun in the late 1960s, and the 1970s saw the 
foundation of regional technical colleges around the country (later called Institutes 
of Technology), expanding greatly the curriculum of studies available for students 
at third-level. Overall, the number of students at third level in 1970 was around 
25,000 of which 18,600 were at university; by 1998 overall numbers at third level 
had grown to 112,200 of which 61,300 were at university and 41,900 at various 
technological colleges.  
 
An Industrial Training Authority was established in 1967 and two decades later 
three different agencies that had grown up to respond to training needs for different 
groups in the labour market were amalgamated into a single labour market training 
agency, named in Gaelic the Foras Áiseanna Saothair (FÁS). From its foundation in 
1987, it began to play a key role in furnishing the skills required by the TNCs 
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moving into Ireland. In his study of FÁS, Boyle states that it is unusual among 
European agencies for the breadth of its responsibilities and it ‘has remained a 
crucially important institution in the Irish political economy throughout the 
economic boom’ with over 1 million people participating in its training and/or 
employment programmes since 1987 (Boyle, 2005: 2). It became such a key 
institution of the Irish state that one third of the structural funds that Ireland 
received under Delors I were spent through FÁS while a quarter of Delors II funds 
were. As a result, Ireland was spending throughout the 1990s around 2 per cent of 
its GDP on active labour market measures, double the OECD average.  
 
iii) Social partnership: 
 
Another major policy initiative widely credited with playing an essential role in 
Ireland’s success, is social partnership. While concertative arrangements at national 
level between employers and trade unions facilitated by the state had resulted in 
negotiated national pay agreements in the 1960s and 1970s, this national approach 
was abandoned in 1980 amid the crisis of the national finances. However, the 
advisory body, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) made up of 
representatives of the state, employers’ bodies, farmers’ organisations and the trade 
unions, continued to elaborate an economic and social analysis agreed among the 
social partners and its 1986 report entitled A Strategy for Development became the 
basis for the incoming government in 1987 to bring the social partners together to 
negotiate a three-year Programme for National Recovery (PNR). This agreement 
between the social partners, not only on national pay awards, but on key elements 
of economic and social policy, has become institutionalised as a feature of Ireland’s 
governance structures; to date seven such agreements have succeeded one another 
with that signed in 2006 covering a ten-year period and entitled Towards 2016.  
 
Furthermore, the partnership principle has been extended to regional and local 
level in such bodies as City and County Development Boards and the local area-
based partnership bodies with a brief for economic and social development in 
deprived areas. In 1996, national social partnership bodies were expanded to 
include Community and Voluntary sector organisations as full members; these 
represent private, charitable and voluntary bodies working with people in poverty, 
people with disabilities, women, and other vulnerable and marginal groups. Social 
partnership, seen by some as part of ‘a new and developing form of governance in 
Ireland’ (Taylor, 2005: 4) is more widely seen to have played a decisive role in 
ensuring wage moderation at a time of high economic growth thus safeguarding 
Ireland’s competitiveness internationally. This was achieved through trading 
moderate national wage increases for reductions in income taxes. In general terms, 
the partnership approach to governance is seen to have maintained industrial and 
social cohesion at a time of major social change.  
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iv) Active social policies for the marginalised: 
 
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, the Irish state significantly expanded its welfare 
effort through the introduction of insurance and means-tested schemes for groups 
like the unemployed, deserted wives and unmarried mothers and new benefits 
including invalidity and death benefit. The period of economic boom in the 1990s 
also saw a new activism in social policy with the establishment of new agencies and 
programmes. Notable among these were the National Anti-Poverty Strategy 
(NAPS), one of the final acts of the social welfare minister and leader of the small 
Democratic Left party, Proinsias de Rossa (1994-97), and the Equality Authority. 
The NAPS charted the rise in poverty since 1973, analysed its causes and set time-
bound targets for poverty reduction: to ‘aim at considerably reducing the numbers 
of those who are “consistently poor” from 9-15 per cent to less than 5-10 per cent’ 
between 1997 and 2007 (NAPS, 1997: 9). These targets were more than met, though 
much debate has taken place about the adequacy of this measure particularly in the 
context of a booming economy. In 2002, the NAPS was revised and integrated with 
the EU National Action Plan on Social Inclusion. The Equality Authority, 
established by the state in 1999, has as its brief to reduce discrimination under nine 
named headings, including gender, sexual orientation, political and religious beliefs 
and membership of the Travelling community. This it does largely through public 
education and through supporting cases against employers or service providers on 
grounds of discrimination.  
 
This section has described some of the key policy mechanisms used by the Irish 
state to help transform the economy and to try to ensure that the benefits of this 
transformation were widely shared throughout society. It offers what may be called 
the dominant or mainstream interpretation and illustrates the central role this 
interpretation accords to the state. As such it offers strong evidence that, at least in 
this test case of globalisation, success has been achieved not by sidelining the state 
or hollowing it out, but rather through the active role it has taken on. However, 
such a positive reading fails to do justice to the ambiguities of the Irish success and 
hence avoids the most interesting questions this throws up for the role the state has 
played. For example, it tends to neglect or elide Ireland’s high level of dependence 
on foreign investment as its motor of economic growth, the increase in relative 
poverty and inequality that has accompanied its boom, and the many social deficits 
that continue to characterise Irish society, particularly in health care and social 
provision (see Kirby, 2002, 2008). It is these ambiguities, and what they tell us about 
the nature and role of the state in the Irish case, that provide the basis for the lively 
debate on characterising the Irish state that has been one interesting legacy of the 
boom for the neglected area of state studies in Ireland. To this debate we now turn. 
 
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2009, No. 1 
8 
 
Debates on the Irish state 
 
Up until the advent of the Celtic Tiger, little scholarly attention had been paid to the 
Irish state. Apart from occasional debates about the state in very specific contexts 
(such as church and state, the post-colonial state or the Irish state in relation to the 
EU), social scientists paid little attention to the Irish state and none at all to its 
developmental capacity (see Adshead, Kirby and Millar, 2008: 4-13 for an 
overview). Only in the 1990s did Irish social scientists for the first time turn their 
attention to the potential of the state to play a decisive role in economic and social 
transformation. Drawing on the East Asian developmental state literature and 
applying it to the Irish case, O’Malley (1989) argued that latecomers to industrial 
development faced specific obstacles (such as advanced technology, large capital 
requirements and highly skilled labour) that required an active state with ‘a 
strategic planning capacity’ to overcome. Similarly, Girvin’s (1989: 211) study of 
economic policy-making from the foundation of the state to 1961 concluded that for 
greater developmental success Ireland would require ‘a strong state to direct the 
economy and to provide for the welfare of the society’. Lee’s (1989) major work 
examined extensively the institutions and culture of the Irish state, further 
reinforcing the conclusion that it bore major responsibility for the country’s 
relatively poor economic and social performance since independence. In their study 
of state, class and development in Ireland, Breen et al. (1990) concluded that the 
Irish ‘state’s capacity – so formidable on paper – on closer examination proves to be 
illusory’ (Breen et al. 1990: 213). One much quoted example of this illusory capacity 
was given by O’Connell and Rottman (1992: 206) who argued that the Irish welfare 
state expanded in such a way as ‘to leave privilege essentially undisturbed’ since it 
combined minimal levels of universal entitlement to income and services with 
market-based resources from which the middle classes were able to benefit 
disproportionately.  
 
Within a few short years the tenor of this debate changed completely to take 
account of emerging evidence that the Irish state was playing a key role in Ireland’s 
economic boom. For example, in later work, O’Malley examined the ways in which 
a more active state policy since the 1980s had resulted in ‘a substantial 
improvement in the growth performance of Irish indigenous industry … without 
historical precedent in twentieth century Ireland’ (O’Malley, 1998: 57). Kirby (1997: 
196-97) argued that the Irish state’s capacity was not as illusory as stated by Breen et 
al. (1990) and that the problem lay rather in the state’s developmental direction, 
deferring too much to conservative forces rather than seeking a more robust project 
of national development. O’Hearn’s (1989, 1998, 2000) extensive work on Ireland’s 
development model also identified as its major weakness the commitment of the 
Irish state to a form of dependent liberal industrialisation which required that it put 
the profitability of transnational corporations before the welfare needs of its own 
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citizens. In a more positive vein, Nolan, O’Connell and Whelan (2000: 2) argued that 
the state had played a key role in Ireland’s transformation, ‘managing both 
economic development and the welfare state’. Central to this success was its ability 
successfully to adjust to global market forces, they contended.  
 
More recent debates about the Irish state have expressed themselves in terms drawn 
from two related but distinct international literatures on the political economy of 
the state – that which developed in the 1980s out of analyses of the role of the East 
Asian state in that region’s developmental success and which elaborated the 
concept of the ‘developmental state’ (Johnson, 1982; Woo-Cumings, 1999; Wade, 
1990; Amsden, 1989) and a more recent political economy literature on the changing 
nature of the state under the impact of economic liberalisation and globalisation 
which proposed the concept of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 2000a and b). In 
applying the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’ taken from Evans (1995) to the Irish 
state, Ó Riain (2000, 2004) characterised the Irish state as a ‘flexible developmental 
state’ in contrast to the bureaucratic developmental states of East Asia, arguing that 
this constitutes a new model of state-led development that is more responsive to the 
demands and pressures of globalisation. His later work slightly amended the 
concept to that of a Developmental Network State (DNS) as ‘network centrality is 
critical to this new state – isolation from the local or the global renders it ineffective’ 
(2004: 4). Though contested by O’Hearn (2000) and Kirby (2002), the concept of the 
developmental state was adopted by the National Economic and Social Council 
(NESC) in its 2003 tri-annual statement of the state’s economic and social strategy 
and used as the basis for proposing a Developmental Welfare State (DWS) for 
Ireland (NESC, 2003: 29-33; 2005a, 2005b).  
 
In critiquing the adequacy of the concept of the developmental state for the Irish 
case, Kirby (2002, 2005) argued that the concept of competition state describes more 
accurately the nature and operation of the Irish state in the era of the Celtic Tiger 
since it prioritises goals of economic competitiveness over those of social cohesion 
and welfare. Following Kirby, Dukelow also adopts the concept of competition state 
for the Irish case as ‘the state has taken a selective interventionist role in the manner 
of a competition state to re-orient social security policy to enhance economic 
competitiveness by tackling unemployment, yet leaving levels of income inequality 
and poverty remain relatively high’ (2004: 27). Boyle, though seemingly unaware 
that the concept had already been introduced into debates on the Irish state, baldly 
states: ‘Contemporary Ireland is an exemplar of the competition state, where social 
policy is subordinated to the needs of the economy’ (2005: 16). In analysing the 
deficiencies of local government in Ireland, Tierney draws on the concept of the 
competition state ‘with its emphasis on the market and the increasing alienation of 
many people from government in the process’ and argues that these deficiencies 
can be effectively addressed through local government (Tierney, 2006: 71).  
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2009, No. 1 
10 
 
These two conceptions of the state – developmental and competition – have some 
common features but differ in a number of crucial ways. Perhaps most significantly, 
both agree that the state can make a difference though, perhaps echoing their 
different origins, the competition state concept recognises more fully the constraints 
placed on state actions by the competitive pressures of today’s globalisation. Both 
acknowledge the uneven nature of state actions, though both also claim that a 
central overarching logic can be identified behind this unevenness. It is the nature 
of this overarching logic that constitutes the key difference as developmental state 
theorists claim that such states possess the capacity to achieve outcomes that 
fundamentally transform the economy and society towards higher levels of 
development. For example, Amsden makes clear the crucial importance of equality 
to this developmental success (Amsden, 2007: 139-42). Competition state theorists, 
on the other hand, identify a logic that moves state actions away from the 
maximisation of welfare towards the promotion of enterprise and profitability as 
national elites respond to the pressures of globalisation. Theorists of both concepts 
recognise that both developmental and competition states do not confirm to 
uniform models but reflect the internal political configurations and culture through 
which the overarching logic of developmentalism or competition is mediated, 
though both literatures have paid insufficient attention to the politics through 
which these logics emerge and come to dominance.  
 
There is less clarity in regard to the possibilities for more progressive forms of both 
types of state. Cerny et al. recognise that neoliberal public policies ‘do not merely 
constrain but also bring opportunities. Contemporary politics entails both a process 
of choosing between different versions of neoliberalism and the attempt to innovate 
creatively within the new neoliberal playing field’ (Cerny et al., 2005: 20; emphasis in 
original). One expression of these possibilities is the emergence of a social 
neoliberalism, they state (ibid.: 20-21). Ó Riain criticises the competition state 
concept since it ‘unnecessarily narrows our understanding of the institutions 
underpinning economic growth’ and obscures ‘the existence of a political space for 
struggles within and through existing institutions over how development could and 
should be structured’ (Ó Riain, 2004: 18). What here distinguishes proponents of 
each of the concepts is the potential for transformation that exists. For, as made 
clear above, competition state theorists also recognise that politics matters and that 
it results in different outcomes in different states – ‘different versions of 
neoliberalism’. Ó Riain goes further in claiming that spaces exist for going beyond 
neoliberalism to social democracy and his book ends by outlining what this might 
entail (2004: 237-42).  
 
Here again what is at issue is more empirical than theoretical: Cerny et al. outline at 
some length the erosion of the basis for a social democratic alternative as it is 
happening in practice in many parts of the world whereas Ó Riain’s account is 
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limited to a purely theoretical outline of what such an alternative might look like in 
Ireland while neglecting the political or social bases for its emergence. On the 
contrary, he acknowledges that the developmental state ‘will face an increasingly 
contentious politics of national inequality because unequal integration into the 
globalisation project undermines solidaristic national social contracts’; however, he 
fails to address how it might overcome these to build a more social democratic 
alternative (2004: 38). From these accounts therefore a lack of clarity lingers as to 
whether, through progressive political actions, both the competition and the 
developmental states could come increasingly to resemble one another. Indeed, 
Cerny has equated the East Asian developmental states with competition states 
(Cerny, 2006: 381). Yet, it does appear that a fundamental difference still 
distinguishes Cerny’s social neoliberalism from Ó Riain’s social democratic 
developmentalism with the latter entailing a much stronger version of governing or 
restraining the market whereas the former is posited on a benign market to which 
the state plays a supporting role.  
 
A number of contributors to this debate have argued against this binary division. 
While acknowledging that ‘strong tendencies towards prioritising economic 
competitiveness are indeed apparent’, Smith rejects that Ireland can be 
characterised as a competition state since some distributive and developmental 
tendencies are also apparent and change over time. She therefore argues that 
Ireland cannot be neatly categorised as either a developmental or a competition 
state and that state policy ‘has instead entailed elements of both’ (Smith, 2005: 120, 
135). She concludes: 
 
 The highly complex (and at times contradictory) picture suggests that 
processes of change need not (and perhaps even should not) be forced into 
all-encompassing categorisations such as ‘the distributive/developmental 
state’ or ‘the competition state’. Rather, it highlights the need to conceive 
change in terms of the ebb and flow of particular tendencies and counter-
tendencies that may shift significantly over time. In turn, such a 
characterisation allows for the possibility that particular tendencies (such as 
those towards prioritising competitiveness) are not confined to a particular 
model but may instead be compatible with a range of state forms (Smith, 
2006: 520; emphasis in original).    
 
O’Donnell is also sceptical of efforts to characterise states, seeing in it echoes of 
Marxist theory and politics in the inter-war period when much hung on whether a 
particular state was characterised as socialist, imperialist or fascist. ‘Nothing 
equivalent hangs on our current characterisations and we might indulge ourselves 
(and mislead ourselves) if we use descriptions in such a categorical way’ 
(O’Donnell, 2008: 74). Instead, he agrees with Smith that what are being examined 
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are dimensions of the Irish state in which one can identify tendencies and counter-
tendencies.  
 
This survey raises more complex questions about the nature and role of the state in 
the context of globalisation, illustrating that the Irish case does not lend itself to 
easy conclusions, despite what might appear from the dominant reading. Yet, 
clearly, a state cannot be both a developmental state and a competition state at the 
same time, if these categories are to have any robust meaning. Or, as Smith and 
O’Donnell would have it, do we have to settle for the fact that it is a bit of both, 
again begging questions about whether the attempt to identify an overriding 
characterisation of the state is an illusory exercise. If it is not possible to arrive at 
any firm identification of how globalisation is serving to reconfigure the nature of 
the Irish state, then it seems that the whole international debate about globalisation 
and the state is rather futile, at least when it gets beyond generalities and attempts 
to engage with the specifics of state change in some detail. If we want to hold that 
the task of identifying the core logic of state actions is a valid one, and thereby to 
identify how globalisation may be impacting on the state, then it seems necessary to 
probe further the bases for the differences that have emerged in the recent debate 
on the Irish state. This is the task of the next section. 
 
Probing the differences to advance understanding 
 
Essentially the differing interpretations of the state in the Irish case derive from 
differing readings of the Celtic Tiger experience. The dominant reading, as 
described in the section above on the role of the Irish state, rests on a positive 
evaluation of the developmental impact of the economic and social changes in 
which state actions played a significant and perhaps even decisive role (being a 
necessary if not sufficient condition). Yet, a more critical interpretation of the Celtic 
Tiger highlights questions about the role of the state that lead some analysts to a 
less positive view. Essentially, five areas of difference can be identified and each is 
treated in turn here. 
 
i) Links between economic transformation and social development: 
 
The single most important difference between a mainstream and a more critical 
reading of the Celtic Tiger relates to the extent to which the high economic growth 
rates achieved are seen to have resulted in social development. Focusing on the 
issues of distribution raises a number of anomalies that are usually neglected in the 
more benign reading of the Irish experience.  
 
The first is the trend in welfare spending over the course of the economic boom. 
While Ireland’s expenditure on education and health are exactly the EU 25 average 
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(as a % of GNP in the Irish case but a percentage of GDP in the case of the other 
countries) (CSO, 2006), Ireland’s spending on social protection in 2002 was well 
below the EU average (at 19.3 per cent of GNP as against an EU25 average of 27.4 
per cent of GDP) (CSO, 2006) though by 2005 the gap had narrowed a little with the 
EU25 average down to 27.2 per cent and the Irish figure up to 21.4 per cent (CSO, 
2008). On ‘service effort’, namely spending on benefits in kind as a percentage of 
GDP (GNP in the Irish case), Ireland slipped from 6th to 8th place out of 14 EU states 
between 1993 and 2001; however when ‘transfer effort’ is measured, namely 
spending on cash benefits, Ireland slipped from 13th to 14th place over the same 
period, namely the years of its economic boom (NESC, 2005a: 97)1. The NESC 
concludes that, ‘compared to other EU member states, Ireland was a low spender on 
social protection’ with ‘a particularly wide gap between Ireland’s relative wealth 
and its relative social spending with the EU’ (NESC, 2005a: 107).  
 
The second is the trend in both budgetary and taxation policy. Examining the 
distributive impact of budgets from 1987 to 2005 (a combination of the distributive 
impact of changes in taxation and in welfare benefits), and thus covering the height 
of the boom, the NESC concluded: 
 
   In the late 1980s, Budgets were generally harsh but protected 
 the incomes of the lowest quintile: they reduced incomes everywhere 
 except for the lowest quintile where they raised incomes significantly. 
 During the first decade of the 1990s (to 1994), Budgets were more 
 benign in their overall impact but preserved a mild redistributive 
 thrust with marginally higher increases in disposable income for the 
 lowest quintile than for other groups. From 1995 to 2002, a regressive 
 pattern was dominant with Budgets improving the disposable income 
 of the top three quintiles by significantly more than for the bottom 
 two quintiles. Finally, after a Budget that almost marked time in 2003, 
 a redistributive thrust has re-emerged with higher increases being 
 occasioned for the lowest quintile than for other groups in the 
 Budgets of 2004 and 2005 (NESC, 2005a: 81). It is paradoxical that, in a 
 period where the state was committed to a National Anti-Poverty 
 Strategy (NAPS), introduced in 1997, the redistributive thrust of 
 government taxation and welfare policy was regressive.   
A third anomaly results from the first two: at a time when the Irish state was 
committed to reducing poverty, relative poverty and inequality grew steadily over 
                                                        
1 Due to the effects of profit repatriation by multinational companies operating in Ireland, 
Gross National Product (GNP) tends to be favoured over Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As 
O’Sullivan points out, Irish GNP has steadily declined in relation to GDP over recent 
decades, being between 14 to 17 per cent less in the early 2000s: ‘There is no other developed 
country where there is such a disparity between GDP and GNP’ (O’Sullivan, 2006: 76).  
 
 
LIMERICK PAPERS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
2009, No. 1 
14 
 
the course of the boom. Official statistics show a steady increase in the percentage of 
persons below 60 per cent of median income from 15.6 per cent in 1994 to 22.7 per 
cent in 2003. The situation of the elderly is particularly striking: the percentage of 
households headed by a retired person which were in poverty in 1994 was 8.2 per 
cent. This increased to 18.4 per cent in 1998 and peaked at 36.9 per cent in 2001 
before dropping to 20.5 per cent in 2005. This is directly attributable to what 
happened to state pensions over this period. Overall, Ireland has one of the lowest 
reductions of risk of poverty through social transfers in the EU. In 2005, the average 
reduction in the risk of poverty in the EU25 was 27 per cent of the population; in 
Ireland it was only 20 per cent of the population, the lowest reduction after Greece, 
Spain and Cyprus (CSO, 2007: Table 4.5). Meanwhile socio-economic inequality, 
already high in comparative international terms before Ireland’s boom, has 
remained stubbornly high and, on some measures, has grown significantly. 
Comparing Ireland’s income distribution after the Celtic Tiger boom with EU and 
OECD countries shows that it remains something of an outlier for its level of 
economic development. Comparing it to 30 countries using data from around 2000, 
Smeeding and Nolan write that ‘Ireland is indeed an outlier among rich nations. 
Only the United States, Russia, and Mexico have higher levels of inequality. … 
Among the richest OECD nations Ireland has the second highest level of inequality’ 
(Smeeding and Nolan, 2004: 9). Meanwhile, trends in the share of national income 
going to the top decile of income earners over the period 1989-2000 show a 
substantial increase from 33 per cent to 38 per cent. The top 1 per cent saw its share 
rise sharply in the second half of the decade with all the growth in the share of the 
top decile being concentrated among this 1 per cent whose share ended up being 
twice what it was in the 1970s and 1980s (Nolan and Maitre, 2007: 33-34). Data on 
the functional distribution of national income confirms this conclusion. From 
having an average wage share of national income compared to the EU in the 1980s 
(71.3 per cent in Ireland compared to 69.6 per cent for the EU12), Ireland’s wage 
share dropped to 62.6 per cent in the 1990s and to 55.1 per cent in the early 2000s 
whereas the EU12’s wage share declined to 66.8 per cent in the 1990s and 64.4 per 
cent in the 2000s (European Commission, 2007).  
 
Overall, then, social policy is characterised by a policy direction that sets very 
modest aims and is inconsistent in adopting effective measures to achieve more 
robust distributional outcomes. As former Fine Gael Taoiseach (prime minister), 
Garret FitzGerald has written:  
 
 It has to be said that we have notably failed to secure the benefits that 
might have been expected to accrue from the fact that we are now one of the 
most prosperous of European states. Our chaotic health service and our grossly 
understaffed education system, together with the many serious inadequacies of 
our social services, reflect very badly upon a political system that has massively 
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maldistributed the huge resources we have created. The harsh truth is we have 
allowed far too much of our new wealth to be creamed off by a few influential 
people, at the expense of the public services our people are entitled to 
(FitzGerald, 2008: 16).  
 
ii) Reliance on FDI and path dependency: 
 
However, the Irish growth model itself raises other anomalies that again are usually 
neglected in the more positive reading of the Irish ‘miracle’. Bradley, an influential 
economist of the Irish boom, identifies three stages that Ireland’s strategy of 
‘industrialisation by invitation’ has followed. The first, corresponding to the period 
from the late 1950s to the mid 1980s, ‘was “factor” driven, based on low rates of 
corporation tax, low wages, and subsidised capital formation’. Acknowledging that 
policy makers in Ireland are now seeking to shift to a strategy based more on 
indigenous innovation, he writes that ‘this has exposed some of the limitations of an 
industrial strategy that came to be based largely on foreign direct investment’ 
(Bradley, 2002: 44). For example, in analysing technological innovation, he draws 
attention to the fact that ‘the forces that drive innovation in products and 
manufacturing processes tend to originate in the USA rather than in Ireland’ and he 
concludes that it is ‘this feature that presents the most serious threat to the survival 
and progress of the sector’ (ibid.: 34-5). The central anomaly of the Irish growth 
model, he expresses as follows: 
 
 The crucial role of management is to formulate a corporate strategy 
that aligns with the nation’s wealth-building strategy. So, this issue is 
usually examined largely from the point of view of domestic corporations 
adjusting to national strategy. In Ireland however, causality more often as 
not runs in the opposite direction. In other words, the Irish Industrial 
Development Agency – the IDA – was constantly scanning the world for 
inward investment in high technology sectors. Quite often the domestic 
environment initially was not sufficiently attractive to persuade cutting edge 
firms to locate in Ireland. But information on firms’ needs was fed back to 
the Irish government authorities by the IDA, and major policy changes 
could be executed rapidly. The national wealth creating strategy in Ireland 
often needs to adapt to the requirements of firms in the global corporate 
environment, and not the other way around (ibid.: 38-9).  
 
Bradley draws the conclusion that, based on international industrial policy 
frameworks, such as Vernon’s product life-cycle framework or Porter’s diamond of 
competitiveness, if Ireland displays behaviour like a less developed region ‘it will 
always remain an underdeveloped country that competes in low cost production of 
maturing products’ (ibid.: 45). His hope is that, based on Best’s capability triad, Irish 
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policy can have more influence over creating the conditions for more 
entrepreneurial Irish firms to emerge in the future. 
 
Recent empirical evidence, however, give grounds for concern about the 
possibilities of such an emergence. Examining Ireland’s innovation performance 
over the period of the Celtic Tiger boom, Hewitt-Dundas and Roper find that the 
proportion of manufacturing plants making product changes has increased by only 
5 per cent over the period while the proportion of plants undertaking process 
innovation declined almost 7 per cent. They find that manufacturing innovation ‘is 
driven by a relatively narrow range of external knowledge sources aside from 
knowledge created within the plant through R&D’. This they put down to the low 
level of business R&D spending in Ireland and ‘the lack of any positive link 
between the extent of innovation activity and links to public knowledge sources’ 
such as universities. Unsurprisingly, they find that externally owned plants and 
those with access to group R&D are more likely to be undertaking product 
innovation (Hewitt-Dundas and Roper, 2008: 59).  
 
iii) Ideology and political culture: 
 
These anomalies raise serious questions therefore about the nature and role of the 
state, requiring a more explicit examination of features of the Irish state and 
political system that can only be briefly touched upon here. Three features are 
examined: ideology and political culture, the relationship between the political 
system and the bureaucracy of the Irish state and the key question of state capacity 
and autonomy. These questions are largely ignored by proponents of the more 
positive view of the state’s role in the Irish case.  
 
FitzGerald has attributed the social neglects of the Celtic Tiger to ‘a very marked 
swing to the right in the broad policy stance of Irish governments’ since the mid 
1980s as ‘the influence of American economic liberalism became much stronger’ 
(FitzGerald, 2003: 29, 30). Such explanations based on ideology find supporting 
evidence in the influence of the neo-liberal Progressive Democrat party on policy as 
they have been in government with Fianna Fáil for the greatest part of this period 
(1989-92 and 1997-2007). Explaining how a small party can have such an influence 
draws attention to central features of Irish political culture that have helped mould 
the Irish state in particular ways. Dominated by a cross-class party, Fianna Fáil, that 
regularly gains the electoral support of between 35 to 40 per cent of the electorate, 
and within an electoral system (Single Transferrable Vote Proportional 
Representation or STVPR) that emphasises localised contests between candidates 
(often from the same party) in multi-seat constituences, Irish politics tends to be  
pragmatic and personality driven, focusing on local issues and with little patience 
for ideology or even sustained policy discussion and formulation. From this 
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political system therefore has emerged a policy system ‘dominated by the culture of 
short-term pragmatic politics’ (Murphy. 2006: 152). Because politicians have little 
interest in long-term policy planning, policy tends to be developed ‘in an ad hoc 
and fragmented fashion’ (ibid.: 125) and the system has spawned a ‘consensus-
driven, blame-avoidance, no-losers political culture’ which, in Murphy’s view, 
appears to be the principal reason for the slow pace and muted type of change in 
Irish social policy (ibid.: 242).  
 
iv) The relationship of the political system to the state: 
 
The localist and non-ideological nature of Irish politics has resulted in a state which 
has relied heavily on the role of professional civil servants in administration and in 
policy development. Research among former Ministers and civil servants has found 
that Ministers did not play a ‘direct role in the internal management of their 
departments’ (quoted in Connolly and O’Halpin, 1999: 263) and instead they leave 
this to civil servants. Retired senior civil servants stressed the incremental nature of 
policy change and Connolly and O’Halpin comment that it is here that civil servants 
probably exert their greatest influence ‘not only through their preparation of 
information and the evaluation of policy alternatives, but also through their 
ongoing contact with a wide range of interest groups’ (ibid.: 263). In examining 
social policy, Murphy sees ‘a lack of policy capacity and a weak tradition of policy 
making’ to be a defining feature of the Irish civil service. Despite the homogeneity 
of the civil service when viewed from outside, she finds ‘great cultural and 
ideological differences and a clear hierarchy between key government 
Departments’ in the area of social policy (Murphy, 2006: 127) while the dominance 
of the cost-fixated Department of Finance is a constant theme in analysis of the Irish 
bureaucracy (Adshead, 2008: 71). Policy tends to get made in tight policy networks 
made up of Ministers, their political and personal advisers and key civil servants, 
supplemented by select academics and outside experts. Examining social policy 
making, Murphy concluded that ‘international policy ideas are carefully filtered 
and selectively amplified to suit the agenda of the domestic actor’ (Murphy, 2006: 
182), which in the case of Ireland is dominated by an emphasis on market 
liberalisation and international competitiveness.  
 
Another dimension of the Irish state relevant to this discussion is its growing 
fragmentation. As it takes on ever more complex responsibilities, the state has 
adopted the practice of establishing new agencies to deal with them. Among these 
are the Combat Poverty Agency, the Equality Authority and FÁS, all mentioned 
above. A recent analysis identified something in excess of 450 public bodies at the 
end of 2005, up to half of which had been created in the last decade (Clancy and 
Murphy, 2006). Furthermore, the Irish state remains highly centralised, with a weak 
form of local government which has very limited tax-raising powers and ‘a 
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drastically reduced set of functions in comparison to their European counterparts’ 
(Ó Broin and Waters, 2007: 55). Over recent years, state responses to a myriad of 
demands (some social demands, others coming from the need for accountability for 
EU funding) have resulted in a complex tangle of agencies with overlapping 
responsibilities at local level, while some 94 per cent of local expenditure decisions 
continue to be made at national level (ibid.: 21). This has resulted in an ever more 
fragmented system of local planning and the provision of services.  
 
v) State capacity and autonomy: 
 
This discussion therefore raises questions about the capacity and autonomy of the 
Irish state that have been scarcely examined with any thoroughness, certainly not 
by those who make claims about that state’s developmental nature. In her ground-
breaking analysis of the subject, Adshead traces ‘the range of autonomy/capacity 
trade-offs … and … Irish governments’ paragmatic propensity to pursue them’ that 
can be identified in ‘the asymmetrical development of the state’ (Adshead, 2008: 72). 
She adds, however, that her characterisation ‘may best be viewed as a set of 
hypotheses for further research’ (ibid.: 70), thus drawing attention to the limits of 
our knowledge of the Irish state.  
 
In the light of this discussion therefore, it is possible to draw the following 
conclusions about the debate on the nature and role of the Irish state. Firstly, 
proponents of the developmental state and of the competition state can both agree 
that the state played a central role in transforming the industrial base of the 
economy through the attraction of high levels of high-tech FDI; however, the major 
disagreement concerns the extent and depth of this productive transformation and 
the link between it and social development. Secondly, proponents of the 
developmental state have concentrated on outcomes achieved and claimed state 
capacity on the basis of this; those who argue for the competition state have drawn 
this conclusion from a more fine-grained analysis of policy-making, policy 
outcomes and the institutions and culture of the state and the political system. 
These have served to draw attention to the contingent nature of the successes 
achieved and to the constantly evolving interaction between the state and its 
political governance. Ó Riain’s analysis of the competing state projects in the 
contemporary Irish political economy illustrates what such a fine-grained analysis 
can contribute to our understanding, highlighting both the developmental potential 
of sectors of the Irish state but also how these were smothered by a neo-liberal 
fixation with tax cuts from the late 1990s (Ó Riain, 2008). In the light of our 
knowledge so far, it seems most accurate to characterise the Irish state as a 
competition state but to acknowledge that despite its overriding logic of global 
competitiveness, pockets of developmentalism do exist within it. While this is 
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consistent with Smith’s view, it has the added advantage of highlighting that the 
logic of competitiveness is the dominant one within the Irish state. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper has been to contribute to understanding the ‘complex 
and contradictory process of transformation [that is] profoundly changing states as 
they respond to the pressures and opportunities of globalisation’ as Sørensen put it. 
It has done this through examining the case of Ireland, regarded by some as a test 
case for this issue. The paper has illustrated the dominant view based largely on a 
description of the key state policies that helped create the Celtic Tiger. The next 
section surveyed the debates on the nature and role of the Irish state before then 
examining aspects of the Irish case than tend to be neglected or underplayed by 
proponents of the developmental state, both outcomes of the economic and social 
change of the past two decades but also features of Ireland’s political culture, its 
political system and its state. This discussion raised questions about just how 
developmental the Irish state has been and concluded that it is a competition state 
with pockets of developmentalism. 
 
What does this offer the wider international literature? Three key points can be 
drawn out. The first concerns the importance of seeking to characterise the state. 
Just as the concept of welfare state emerged during the era of national capitalism to 
capture the ways the state was being reconfigured within the opportunities 
presented by that era, the task of characterising the changed nature of the state 
today allows a probing of the opportunities and limitations presented by today’s 
era of globalised liberal capitalism and also the ways states manoeuvre within this 
context. The second point draws attention to an aspect that has tended to be lost 
sight of in much of the literature on the changing nature of the state, namely that 
any particular state’s response is moulded by the structure of its economy (and here 
the Irish state’s extreme dependence on FDI obviously acts as a constraint), by its 
political culture and party system, by the institutions and structure of the state 
itself, and by the nature of civil society activism and organisation. Therefore, just as 
few now dispute that a broad range of welfare states exists, so too this examination 
of the Irish case illustrates that the model of state emerging under the constraints 
and pressures of globalisation, what is here labeled the competition state, is bound 
to display different forms. Examining the Irish case shows the potential for 
upgrading the capacity of one small state’s economy by making use of 
opportunities opened by globalisation but it also shows that these benefits are 
captured within the constraints of that state’s political system and state organisation 
which pose limits to the extent to which these benefits end up being 
developmentally transformative, both economically and, particularly, socially. The 
third point that can be highlighted from the above is that, while much empirical 
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work remains to be done to describe and analyse the forms of competition state that 
are emerging, what has been almost entirely neglected in the literature is any fine-
grained examination of the potential that exists for more progressive and socially 
just forms of the competition state to emerge. For, as the conditions for social 
democracy seem to recede, this may be the best hope in the immediate future, for 
mobilising and channeling political forces for progressive social change. 
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